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REOPENING THE LOOPHOLE: AVOIDING SECURITIES
FRAUD DEBT THROUGH BANKRUPTCY
*

Andrew L. Van Houter
I.

INTRODUCTION

H.E. Pennypacker was a high-powered securities dealer whose
clients were mostly small-time investors. Pennypacker routinely took
advantage of his unsophisticated clients, many of them immigrants
with little command of the English language. Pennypacker used his
charm and savvy sales skills to induce investors to hand over their life
savings for him to invest. Pennypacker, however, failed to explain the
risks to his clients and omitted material information in the
prospectus. After many complaints from investors who lost their
savings, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated
and ultimately brought charges against Pennypacker. Pennypacker
settled the case for $250,000 without admitting liability. He then
immediately filed for bankruptcy, never intending to pay the
settlement he signed with the SEC.
Since his bankruptcy,
1
Pennypacker opened a new brokerage firm and continues to defraud
*

J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Political Science, Lander
College for Men, Touro College. Thank you to Professor Stephen J. Lubben,
Professor Kristin N. Johnson, and Marissa Litwin for their comprehensive comments
and guidance.
1
Although the SEC may have prevented Pennypacker from opening a new
brokerage firm by exercising its powers to revoke the registration of broker dealers,
see Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 209(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2010); Investment
Company Act of 1940 § 42(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2006); The Securities Act of 1933 §
20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006); The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15
U.S.C. § 78a (2006), revocation of registration is not automatic. “The Commission
generally focuses its limited resources in the broker-dealer examination program on
firms with the greatest potential for significant financial risk and risk to material
violations of the securities laws. The leading type of examination in recent years is
the cause examination,” which is based on a tip or complaint. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N,
STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER DEALERS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF
THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT A-14 (2011).
“In recent years, approximately 94% of examinations concluded with a deficiency
letter which summarizes . . . findings and requests corrective action.” Id. at A-15.
While the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), as a self-regulatory
organization, has the authority to sanction its members, Securities Exchange Act of
1934 §§ 15A(b), 19(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006), there were only 211 license
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investors. Given recent trends in the financial sector, these facts
strike an emotional chord and highlight the sensibility of
guaranteeing that all settlements for securities laws violations survive
a bankruptcy petition. This would thereby ensure that dishonest
debtors would be unable to hide behind the law to the detriment of
their honest and unfortunate creditors.
A slight variation of the facts, however, reveals the harsh
ramifications of implementing a blanket bankruptcy protection that
automatically attaches to all settlements for securities violations.
Consider Art Vandelay, the one-time owner of a small mattress retail
store in Anytown, U.S.A. With dreams of moving into a bigger and
better location on Main Street, Art Vandelay needed to raise capital.
Vandelay mentioned his plans over Thanksgiving dinner and Janice,
a friend of his mother’s, agreed to invest. Vandelay, excited about
the prospect of expanding his business, accepted $100,000 from
Janice, and, in return, issued Janice thirty-five percent of the
company’s shares, which were not registered with the local Bureau of
3
Securities. When business slowed and Vandelay’s mattress store no
longer made a profit, Janice sued Vandelay for issuing unregistered
securities. Vandelay casually mentioned the story to a friend who told
Vandelay that not all securities need to be registered and his may be
exempt. Vandelay calculated that it would be cheaper to just settle
the case and did so for $25,000 without admitting liability. In reality,
Vandelay’s shares were exempt from the state’s registration
requirements. Vandelay paid the annuities on the settlement at first,
but a few years later, his home was foreclosed on and Vandelay was

suspensions and 159 license revocations out of the 6,387 examinations it conducted
into broker-dealers based on tips or complaints in 2010. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra,
at A-12. Thus, while it is possible that Pennypacker could have been prevented from
opening another brokerage firm, it is by no means a given. Furthermore, even if
Pennypacker’s license were suspended or revoked, he may, as an unscrupulous
fraudster, attempt to continue to do business until he is stopped. Therefore, this
hypothetical is entirely possible.
2
See Lydie Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: The
Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Securities Arbitration, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 307, 308–09
(2007), on which this hypothetical is based.
3
Each state has its own agency dedicated to regulating state securities laws.
Mark J. Astarita, Guide to State Securities Administrators, SEC LAW.COM,
http://www.seclaw.com/stcomm.htm (last updated Nov. 9, 2011). In New Jersey, for
example, that agency is the Bureau of Securities. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-66 (West
1997); see also Fact Sheet: New Jersey Bureau of Securities, NEW JERSEY BUREAU OF
SECURITIES, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/bos/bosoverview.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2012) (“The Bureau of Securities within the New Jersey office of the Attorney
General is the state’s securities regulatory agency.”).
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forced into bankruptcy before fully paying the settlement. Because
all settlements resolving claims of securities laws violations survive
bankruptcy, Vandelay must continue to pay the settlement payments
to Janice and the substantial debt effectively bars Vandelay from
4
receiving a financial fresh start.
Clearly, these facts curb the
emotional reaction that the first story elicits, and cause one to
reconsider issuing an all-inclusive bankruptcy immunity to all
settlements for claims of securities laws violations.
We are thus presented with a dilemma: Do we utilize the
bankruptcy code to protect investors at the risk of harming innocent
debtors like Art Vandelay, the mattress store owner? Or do we allow
innocent creditors, like the unsophisticated investors duped by
Pennypacker, to be harmed for the sake of preserving debtors’ rights
to a fresh start? This Comment will explain how and why the current
law treats both cases the same and suggests possible distinctions that
should be implemented through amendment to the bankruptcy code
based on public policy.
To fully appreciate the policy dilemma, it is important to have a
basic understanding of fundamental bankruptcy principals and
concepts. The main policy behind the federally created bankruptcy
5
code is to grant debtors a means to achieve a financial fresh start. As
the Supreme Court stated, bankruptcy “gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
6
pre-existing debt.” In other words, bankruptcy provides the much7
needed compassion in a capitalistic society.
Employing the
8
discharge accomplishes this goal. Essentially, the discharge releases
4

See Teresa H. Pearson, What Bankruptcy Lawyers Need to Know About the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 and the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002,
FINDLAW (Mar. 26, 2008), http://library.findlaw.com/2003/Mar/26/132662.html,
on which this hypothetical is based.
5
BANKR. JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 6
(rev. 3d ed. 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts
/FederalCourts/BankruptcyResources/bankbasics2011.pdf.
6
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
7
The American “fresh start” concept is a uniquely liberal bankruptcy concept
that is not completely duplicated in other developed countries. See Iain Ramsay,
Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 241, 250–51 (2007); UDO
REITNER ET AL., CONSUMER OVERINDEBTEDNESS AND CONSUMER LAW IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 165–66 (2003), available at http://www.ecri.eu/new/system/files/26
+consumer_overindebtedness_consumer_law_eu.pdf. The American broad fresh
start, however, is counterbalanced by the non-existence of a broader social safety net
like those present in European countries. See Ramsay, supra, at 245–47.
8
BANKR. JUDGES DIV., supra note 5, at 6; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2006)
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a debtor from all personal liability from certain debts. Once a
discharge occurs, creditors are forbidden from attempting to collect
10
Creditors are even barred from harassing the debtor
the debt.
about the debts through phone calls, letters, or any other means of
11
communication.
12
The
The discharge, however, does not apply to all debts.
13
bankruptcy code lists certain types of debts that survive a discharge.
The statutory exceptions to discharge reflect Congress’s conscious
policy decision that preserving the ability to collect certain types of
14
debts is of greater importance than granting debtors a fresh start.
Therefore, if an exception from discharge applies, the debt will
survive bankruptcy and remain collectable. For that reason, debts
resulting from wrongful or dishonest conduct are generally not
15
dischargeable in bankruptcy. The underpinning of the policy is
obvious; Congress created the discharge to give the honest debtor a
16
17
fresh start, but the dishonest debtor deserves no such protection.
Thus, many dischargeability debates focus on the two goals of
protecting honest debtors and preventing dishonest fraudsters from
18
evading liability by hiding behind the bankruptcy code.
One such exception from discharge based on debt incurred
through wrongful conduct is the securities-claims exception of
19
section 523(a)(19). Congress added this exception to discharge as
part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which, in turn, was a
20
response to corporate fraud. As the legislative history makes clear,
Congress intended that the securities-claims exception prevent
(describing the effects of a discharge).
9
BANKR. JUDGES DIV., supra note 5, at 6.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 9.
12
See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006) (listing all the exceptions to discharge).
13
Id.
14
Honorable Bernice B. Donald & Kenneth J. Cooper, Collateral Estoppel in
Section 523(c) Dischargeability Proceedings: When is a Default Judgment Actually Litigated?,
12 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 323 (1995–96).
15
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006) (excepting from discharge debt
incurred by fraud); § 523(a)(4) (excepting from discharge debt incurred by fraud
while acting in a fiduciary capacity); § 523(a)(6) (excepting from discharge debt
incurred by willful and malicious injury); § 523(a)(11) (excepting from discharge
debt incurred by fraud while acting in a fiduciary capacity to a bank).
16
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
17
Donald & Cooper, supra note 14, at 323.
18
Id. at 323–24.
19
See § 523(a)(19).
20
See infra Part II.A.
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fraudsters from using the bankruptcy code to evade debts for their
21
Prior to the exception’s enactment, many cases
wrongdoings.
resulted in investors failing to collect their awards because fraudsters
received bankruptcy protection after losing or settling securities
22
claims. Many small investors forfeited their entire life-savings and
pursued an expensive lawsuit to recover their losses, only to be
23
denied any recovery because of a loophole in the bankruptcy code.
As one commentator put it, “[t]he defrauded small investor [was] left
without any further recourse and a much lighter purse. The
unscrupulous brokerage firm or broker receive[ed] [a] discharge
order . . . and trot[ted] off into the sunset emboldened to defraud yet
24
The securities-claims exception is meant to
another investor.”
25
prevent that situation and close the loophole.
The exception to discharge for debt resulting from securities
laws violations exempts from discharge all debt that is (1) for the
violation of any securities laws; and (2) is memorialized in some final
26
order, such as a judgment, order, or settlement.
The provision
provides, in relevant part, that any debt
(19) that—
(a) is for—
(i) the violation of any of the Federal securities
laws (as that term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), any of the
State securities laws, or any regulation or order
issued under such Federal or State securities
laws . . . and
(b) results, before, on or after the date from which the
petition was filed, from—
(i) any judgment, order, consent order, or decree
entered in any Federal or State judicial or
administrative proceeding;
(ii) any settlement agreement entered into by the
21

See infra Part III.B.
Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 321–22.
23
Id. at 322.
24
Id. at 322; See also supra note 1 (explaining how a fraudster can continue to
defraud despite a regulatory agency or private litigant previously attempting to stop
him).
25
See S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002) (“Current bankruptcy law may permit
wrongdoers to discharge their obligations under court judgments or settlements
based on securities fraud and securities laws violations. This loophole in the law
should be closed . . . .”).
26
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2006).
22
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27

debtor . . . .
A simple reading seems clear and evidently provides that any
settlement agreement or judgment resolving claims of securities laws
violations are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, and thus the
28
loophole that previously existed is ostensibly closed.
This
29
interpretation is also consistent among scholars. A careful reading
of the statute, however, shows that this common understanding may
not be accurate.
The language of the statute is vague, confusing, and perhaps
contrary to congressional intent. According to ordinary principles of
statutory construction, by using the conjunction “and,” the statute
lists elements, all of which are required to satisfy the original
30
proposition. Further, the bankruptcy code has its own explicit rules
of construction that states the use of the word “or” is non-exclusive so
that the conditions can be satisfied by any one of the elements joined
31
by an “or.”
Thus, by using the word “and,” Congress may have
consciously avoided the code’s definition of “or,” and therefore
intentionally required that all elements be satisfied for 523(a)(19)’s
exception to apply, thereby evidencing specific congressional intent
to require both elements, in addition to ordinary principles of
statutory construction. Accordingly, the placement of “and” between
32
the two elements of the statute seems to predicate a nondischargeability determination on: (1) a finding of a violation of
securities laws that is (2) memorialized in a settlement or other final
order.
This understanding presents an anomaly: there must be a
definitive violation memorialized in a settlement. Settlements,
33
however, often do not admit liability.
“The whole point of
27

Id. (emphasis added).
See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
29
See, e.g., James P. Menton, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley and the New Nondischargeable Debt:
Drafting Tips for Pre-Bankruptcy Settlements, 8 COMM. & BUS. LIT. 9 (Winter 2007);
Pearson, supra note 4; G. Ray Warner, Accounting Reform Law Adds Broad Securities
BANKR.
INST.
(Sept.
1,
2002),
Fraud
Discharge
Exception,
AM .
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM
/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=32493.
30
YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 8 (Aug. 31, 2008); see also Pueblo of Santa
Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1292 (D.N.M. 1996).
31
See 11 U.S.C. § 102(5) (2006).
32
See § 523(a)(19).
33
See Reply Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment/Summary Adjudication at 4, Mollasgo v. Tills, 419 B.R. 444 (Bankr. S.D.
28
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settlement is to avoid trials and determinations of disputed facts, and
to resolve litigation without the need for adjudications of fault or
34
responsibility.” Moreover, settlements that neither admit nor deny
liability (“no-fault settlements”) are desirable to both defendants and
plaintiffs—a defendant does not want to admit liability and thereby
be exposed to further litigation, and plaintiffs want to save the costs
35
of litigation. Accordingly, if a definitive violation of securities laws is
a prerequisite to non-dischargeability, and settlements are unlikely to
contain an admission of guilt, Congress never fully closed the
loophole. Unscrupulous securities dealers who enter into traditional
settlements will still receive bankruptcy protection to the detriment
36
and financial harm of their victims. Further, because most securities
37
claims end in settlements and not judgments, the poorly drafted
exception may actually accomplish nothing and provide no
protection to investors.
Thus, a careful reading of the statute exposes a contradiction
38
between congressional intent and statutory language, requiring
judges and bankruptcy and securities lawyers alike to ponder if
Congress meant what it said or if Congress meant what it wrote. This
is a question of “critical importance” because the determination of
39
dischargeability can cause millions of dollars to change hands. The
significance of dischargeability questions is highlighted by the fact
that they consume twenty-seven percent of bankruptcy judges’ “caserelated” time and over sixteen percent of their total “work-related”
40
time.
Determining the correct interpretation of section 523(a)(19),
therefore, is crucial, both because of its impact on investors and
Cal. 2009) (No. 09-90054-LT), 2009 U.S. Bankr. Ct. Motions LEXIS 6255, at *7; see
also Jean Eaglesham & Chad Bray, Citi Ruling Could Chill SEC, Street Legal Pacts, WALL
ST.
J.,
Nov.
29,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203935604577066242448635560
.html (describing how a federal district court judge’s rejection of an SEC settlement
that neither admits nor denies liability of the underlying charges threatens to drain
government resources because, since their settlements will be rejected, agencies will
be forced to go to trial).
34
Reply Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment/Summary Adjudication, supra note 33, at *7.
35
See Eaglesham & Bray, supra note 33.
36
See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
37
Charles M. Yablon, Essay, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private
Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 586 (2000).
38
See infra Part III.B.
39
Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 324.
40
Id.
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victims of securities fraud, and because it will affect how securities
41
settlements are drafted. The answer requires careful review of the
legislative history and context, as well as consideration of pressing
policy concerns. This Comment will review the history and context of
section 523(a)(19), as well as canons of statutory construction, and
argue that the correct interpretation of the securities-claims
exception renders all settlements—even if such settlements fail to
definitively establish a violation of securities laws—non-dischargeable
in any subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. This Comment then
considers the harsh ramifications of that interpretation, as previously
42
introduced with the story of Art Vandelay, the mattress store owner.
To reconcile these concerns and further public policy, this Comment
then suggests an amendment to the bankruptcy code that creates a
distinction between debts incurred through settlements with the
government and debts incurred through settlements with private
creditors, and distinguishes between debts arising from fraudulent
behavior and debts arising from mere technical violations of the
securities laws.This Comment argues that an amendment that
clarifies section 523(a)(19) and renders only debts arising from
fraudulent securities violations non-dischargeable, and further
requires private plaintiffs to prove the securities violations while
allowing the government to rely on settlements that do not
definitively establish violations, is consistent with congressional intent
and public policy.
At the time of this writing, only one case, Mollasgo v. Tills (In re
43
Tills), has attempted to discern the correct interpretation of section
44
523(a)(19) at length, but there, the bankruptcy court arrived at a
41

See Menton, supra note 29 (delineating specific provisions to be included in
settlement agreements in order to ensure non-dischargeability).
42
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
43
419 B.R. 444 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).
44
Other cases have cited to Mollasgo, but no case has provided as detailed an
analysis of § 523(a)(19). See Nace v. Quibell (In re Quibell), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS
1423, at * 19–21 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2012) (citing Mollasgo’s recitation of the
legislative history behind section 523(a)(19) when dismissing the plaintiff’s
complaint for failure establish that the money defendant owed plaintiff under a note
was related to a cease and desist order issued by the state securities commission);
Trimble v. Putman (In re Putman), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2117, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
June 2, 2011) (citing Mollasgo as support for plaintiffs’ argument—which the court
ultimately rejected—that collateral estoppel should apply to default judgments with
regards to dischargeability determinations under section 523(a)(19)); Voss v. Pudjak
(In re Pudjak), 462 B.R. 560, 576–79 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (citing Mollasgo’s use of an
analogy to section 523(a)(11) in interpreting section 523(a)(19), as discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 129–147, but ultimately coming to a conclusion that
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flawed conclusion. Accordingly, after a brief introduction about the
widespread corporate fraud giving rise to SOX and section
523(a)(19), Part II of this Comment will describe, in detail, the
Mollasgo holding.
Part III will show how the Mollasgo court
misapplied precedent, reached a holding that is inconsistent with
other jurisdictions, and frustrated congressional intent when it
interpreted the statute to require a definitive finding of securities
laws violations. This Part will conclude that the correct interpretation
of section 523(a)(19) renders all debts arising from securities laws
violations non-dischargeable, even if the violations are not actually
adjudicated. Part IV will then examine the consequences of the
present blanket securities-claims exception to discharge, and will
suggest an amendment to the exception, which would distinguish
between private creditors and governmental regulators, such as the
SEC, and restrict the section’s applicability to fraudulent violations in
order to serve public policy. Finally, this Comment concludes that
such an amendment, which excepts from discharge only those debts
that arise from fraudulent violations of the securities laws and
requires private plaintiffs to prove the underlying allegations, is
consistent with congressional intent and public policy.
II. FROM ENRON TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA’S BANKRUPTCY COURT:
HOW GREAT FRAUD LED TO OVERREGULATION THAT MUST BE CURED
A. America Hastily Responds to Systemic Corporate Fraud
The addition of section 523(a)(19) came as part of the SarbanesOxley Act, which, like most financial reforms, came about as the
45
result of a major crisis. Sarbanes-Oxley followed Enron, one of the

contradicts the holding of Mollasgo);.Wilkes v. Cancelosi (In re Cancelosi), 456 B.R.
515, 522 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011) (citing Mollasgo for the proposition that section
523(a)(19) has a dual requirement; namely that the debt results from a violation of
securities laws, and that the debt be memorialized in a final order or settlement);
Nace v. Quibell (In re Quibell), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3297, at *19 n.5 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
Jan. 28, 2011).
45
See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT
WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 19 (2006) (citing, as other examples, the English
Bubble Act passed during the South Sea Bubble and the U.S. federal securities laws
passed in response to the 1929 stock market crash); see also Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521,
1528 (2005) (“Simply put the corporate governance provisions were not a focus of
careful deliberation by Congress. SOX was emergency legislation, enacted under
conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media frenzy involving several highprofile corporate fraud and insolvency cases.”).
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46

biggest corporate frauds ever perpetrated. Enron started in 1985 as
a simple Texas pipeline company, but it quickly developed into one
of America’s leading corporations creating new markets for energy
47
trading. Enron deliberately used faulty, unconventional accounting
to conceal losses, inflate potential profits, and artificially raise its
48
share price. These tactics left shareholders unknowingly holding
49
worthless stock. Enron shocked its shareholders, and the world,
50
when it revealed the true accounting in the second quarter of 2001.
Enron’s announcement resulted in a sudden $618 million loss for the
third quarter of 2001, reduced shareholder equity by $1.2 million,
and forced the company into bankruptcy—the then-largest
51
bankruptcy filed in the history of the United States. The extent of
the fraud was enormous, costing the average American household
52
$60,000. Rubbing salt in the wounds, many Enron executives who
53
were aware of the fraud during its perpetration took advantage of a
Texas homestead law shielding their million-dollar-mansions from
54
creditors while simultaneously filing for bankruptcy. America was
46

While Enron was the event that called attention to corporate scandals, it was
not the only factor leading to SOX. In fact,
Sarbanes-Oxley would not have been enacted if Enron had been an
isolated event. Enron’s bankruptcy was soon followed by the financial
collapse of approximately a dozen large public companies where there
was also strong evidence of reporting violations and audit failures even
more egregious than that which occurred in Enron.
JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN, DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 6th ed. 2009).
47
Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 309 n.4; Lucian Murley, Note, Closing a
Bankruptcy Loop-Hole or Impairing a Debtor’s Fresh Start? Sarbanes-Oxley Creates a New
Exception to Discharge, 92 KY. L.J. 317, 317 (2004).
48
Murley, supra note 47, at 317–18.
49
Id.
50
Id.; see also Steven G. Schulman, U. Seth Ottensoser & Russel D. Morris, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Impact on Civil Litigation under the Federal Securities Laws
from the Plaintiff’s Perspective, ALI-ABA Course of Study Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Impact
on Civil Litigation under Federal Securities Laws, Dec. 5, 2002 at 297 (281).
51
Schulman, Ottensoser & Morris, supra note 50, at 297. Enron’s record
bankruptcy was surpassed less than a year later by WorldCom’s filing for bankruptcy
protection after its own accounting scandal was exposed. See Simon Romero & Riva
D. Atlas, WorldCom’s Collapse: The Overview; WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S.
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES,
July
22,
2002,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overviewworldcom-files-for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html?pagewanted=all.
52
Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 311; Murley, supra note 47, at 318.
53
See Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 309 n.4.
54
Nelson S. Ebaugh, The Securities Claim Exemption in Bankruptcy: The Good, the
Bad,
and
the
Ugly,
19
SEC.
LITIG.
J.
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ebaughlaw.com/uploads/1/1/9/4/11948411/securities_claim

VAN HOUTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

11/12/2012 2:59 PM

COMMENT

1723

55

outraged; Congress needed to act.
56
SOX is a
Congress responded with Sarbanes-Oxley.
comprehensive piece of legislation “intended to rein in corporate
executives run amok and restore investor confidence” in corporate
57
America. Many embraced it as the answer to corporate greed. For
example, President Bush, when he signed it into law, praised the act,
remarking that it was one of the “the most far reaching reforms of
American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
58
Roosevelt.” Harvey Pitt, then SEC Chairman, described the law as
assurance that “abuses of the system are not, and will not be allowed
59
to become, the norm in American business.”
But SOX, arguably, was nothing more than an emotionally
60
driven, knee-jerk reaction to Enron, much like most readers’ initial
61
reaction to the opening story of this Comment. Like many initial
62
emotional reactions, SOX was not appropriately formulated. SOX
was introduced to Congress a mere six weeks after the release of the
63
Board of Directors’ Official Report on Enron. Despite its obvious
64
quick drafting, there was little Congressional debate over the bill.
Hardly any Member of the House spoke on any of the bill’s major
65
proposals. Some commentators claim that the Senate only heard
from biased witnesses who did not present any evidence on balancing
66
67
costs and benefits. Rather, the Senate swiftly passed the legislation.
“Simply put, the corporate governance provisions were not a focus of
_exemption_in_bankruptcy.pdf.
55
See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45, at 19.
56
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
57
Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 310.
58
BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45, at 9.
59
Harvey L. Pitt, SEC Chairman, Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association Business Law Section (Aug. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm.
60
See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45, at 19 (calling the Act “just one example
of the ‘Sudden Acute Regulatory Syndrome’”).
61
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
62
See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45, at 7. (“Congress knew very little when it
acted precipitously, in the midst of a regulatory panic” and “Congress acted
precipitously, without anything resembling a balanced consideration of the issues.”).
63
Keith N. Sambur, Note, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Effect on Section 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code: Are All Securities Laws Debts Really Nondischargeable?, 11 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 561, 561 (2003).
64
BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45, at 20.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
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careful deliberation by Congress. SOX was emergency legislation,
enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate, during a
media frenzy involving several high-profile corporate fraud and
68
insolvency cases.”
Due to the deficient procedure in the bill’s
passing, it is understandable that the final product has many
69
imperfections. One such imperfection is the vague language of the
70
securities-claims exception to discharge in bankruptcy.
B. Mollasgo Unraveled
The only court to squarely attempt to interpret the vague
71
language of section 523(a)(19) is the Mollasgo court. The facts of
the case are as follows: A creditor lost money in a real estate
investment when the debtor allegedly violated state securities laws
72
and perpetrated a fraud.
The parties entered into a no-fault
settlement agreement, in which neither party admitted fault nor
73
liability. During the course of settlement negotiations, the debtor
expressed intentions to file for bankruptcy after signing the
74
settlement. The debtor made no payments of the settlement and
voluntarily filed for bankruptcy about a month after settling the
75
claims. The creditor initiated a judicial proceeding to deem the
debt non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(19) and moved for
76
summary judgment.
The court denied summary judgment, holding that the plain
77
language of the statute required an established violation of
78
securities laws in order to render the settlement non-dischargeable.
According to the court, the settlement in question, by expressly not
79
admitting liability, failed to satisfy this element. To support this
contention, the court examined the legislative history and concluded
that Congress’s intent was to prevent established wrongdoers from
manipulating the bankruptcy code to shield themselves from
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Romano, supra note 45, at 1528.
See generally BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45.
See supra notes 30–39 and accompanying text.
But see sources cited supra note 44.
Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 448–49.
Id. at 449.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 451.
Id.
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investor-litigants.
The court reasoned that without a definitive establishment of a
81
violation, there is no wrongdoer. In reaching this conclusion, the
Mollasgo court relied heavily on the purported stated purpose of the
statute, which is to “make judgments and settlements arising from
state and federal securities law violations brought by state and federal
regulators and private individuals non-dischargeable.
Current
bankruptcy law may permit wrongdoers to discharge their obligations
under court judgments or settlements based on securities fraud and
82
securities law violations.”
Accordingly, the court concluded that
“[t]he [Senate] Report focuses on resolved securities violations,
83
rather than on settled claims of violations.”
The court further
stated, “the Report and the Act’s author support the conclusion that
section 523(a)(19) is intended to target securities laws violators, not to
generally penalize all debtors who settle allegations of securities
84
violations.”
Since the statute only exempts from discharge
wrongdoers’ settlements, the court reasoned that because the creditor
in the instant case failed to obtain an admission of liability, the
settlement could not benefit from the protection offered by section
85
523(a)(19). The court conceded that Congress intended to give
settlements preclusive effect, but reasoned that preclusive effect
could not be granted to the settlement at issue because the
86
agreement expressly failed to resolve the question of liability. The
court therefore concluded “that Congress provided plaintiffs with a
valuable tool in securities litigation, but also allowed the parties to
avoid de facto non-dischargeability through settlement agreement
87
language that expressly avoids any concession of fault or liability.”
The court claimed that Supreme Court jurisprudence supported
88
its conclusions. Mollasgo relied on Archer v. Warner, which held that
settlement agreements do not create a novation, and bankruptcy
courts should instead look to the circumstances that gave rise to the
settlement to determine if it arose from conduct that would render

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 452.
Id.
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002)).
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002)).
Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 452.
Id. at 453.
Id.
Id. at 454.
Id.
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the debt non-dischargeable. Archer dealt with a claim brought under
section 523(a)(2), which excepts from discharge claims that arise out
90
of fraud. Mollasgo applied Archer’s ruling and, without determining
the factual question of liability, held that the settlement was not
91
automatically non-dischargeable.
The Mollasgo court therefore
92
denied the creditor’s summary judgment motion.
The Mallasgo court also looked to persuasive authority
93
interpreting section 523(a)(11). Section 523(a)(11) excepts from
discharge those debts that stem from “any final judgment,
unreviewable order, or consent order . . . or contained in any settlement
agreement entered into by the debtor, arising from any act of fraud or
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity . . . with respect to any
94
depository institution or insured credit union.” The Mallasgo court
95
therefore looked to Meyer v. Ridgon, a case dealing with a section
523(a)(11) settlement, and found further support for the denial of
96
summary judgment in the case before it. In its reasoning, Mollasgo
cited to a hypothetical that the Meyer court created to illustrate the
97
power of section 523(a)(11). The hypothetical illustrated a scenario
that would render a settlement non-dischargeable when the debtor
98
Because the hypothetical only dealt with a
admitted liability.
settlement where the debtor admitted liability, the Mollasgo court
reasoned that the Meyer court would have reached a different holding
99
if the settlement did not admit liability. The Mollasgo court also
supported its conclusions by pointing out that the Meyer court
“looked behind the default judgment” to determine if the underlying
100
facts supported a finding of non-dischargeability.
The Mollasgo
court therefore concluded that the interpretation of the similar
language in section 523(a)(11) mandates that section 523(a)(19)
does not render settlements automatically dischargeable if they fail to
expressly admit liability, and rather that courts should carefully
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

538 U.S. 314, 322–23 (2003).
Id.
Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 454 (citing Archer, 538 U.S. at 323).
See id.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(11) (2006).
Id. (emphasis added).
36 F.3d 1375 (7th Cir. 1994).
Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 456 (citing Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1380).
Id.
Meyer, 36 F.3d. at 1379.
Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 456.
Id.
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examine such settlements to ensure that a securities law violation
101
actually occurred.
The Mollasgo court then distinguished relevant case law that
seemingly supported the creditor’s argument that the settlement
should be excepted from discharge. The court distinguished
102
Peterman v. Whitcomb (In re Whitcomb), a case that held a no-fault
settlement to be non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(19), on the
basis that the debtor in Whitcomb agreed that he damaged the
103
creditor.
The court also distinguished Hodges v. Buzzeo (In re
Buzzeo), a case holding a similar no-fault settlement nondischargeable under section 523(a)(19), on the basis that the
settlement agreement included a waiver by the debtor of his right to
104
discharge the debt in bankruptcy.
Policy considerations also influenced the Mollasgo court. First,
the court noted that, generally, settlements are to be encouraged as
105
an amicable resolution of disputes.
The court then reasoned that
rendering all settlements of securities claims non-dischargeable, even
106
those that do not establish liability, would discourage settlements.
The court was also concerned about denying innocent and honest
107
debtors their fresh start, which a blanket exception to discharge of
all settlements of securities violations would inevitably do, as
demonstrated by Vandelay’s story at the beginning of this
108
Comment.
The court recognized that automatically rendering all
securities claims settlements non-dischargeable will prevent innocent
109
debtors from even pleading their case. Such a result is contrary to
110
the fundamental bankruptcy principal of the fresh start.
In short,
the very same issues that intuitively perturb the reader of the second
111
hypothetical at the beginning of this Comment bothered the court.
The Mollasgo court put forth well-articulated reasons for
concluding that section 523(a)(19) requires a definitive finding of a
101

Id.
303 B.R. 806 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
103
Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 456 (citing Whitcomb, 303 B.R. at 808).
104
Id. at 456–57 (citing Hodges v. Buzzeo (In re Buzzeo), 365 B.R. 578, 580–81
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007)).
105
Id. at 454.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 454–55.
108
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
109
Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 454–55.
110
See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text.
111
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
102
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securities law violation. The court’s reasoning, however, is flawed. A
careful analysis reveals that the Mollasgo court arrived at its conclusion
by misapplying precedent and improperly distinguishing germane
112
persuasive authority.
Further, the Mollasgo holding is contrary to
congressional intent, which supports a conclusion that all settlements
of securities laws violations are automatically non-dischargeable,
113
regardless of the absence of an adjudication of liability. Thus, while
the court raised some valid policy concerns, it improperly interpreted
section 523(a)(19).
III: EXAMINING MOLLASGO AND DETERMINING THE TRUE
INTERPRETATION OF THE SECURITIES CLAIM EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE
The reasoning in Mollasgo is based on misapplications of
precedent, and the court’s holding conflicts with congressional intent
114
and the holdings of other jurisdictions. Mollasgo’s interpretation of
section 523(a)(19) is therefore incorrect, and further analysis is
required to solve the question of dischargeability in securities claims.
This Part will first refute the Mollasgo court’s reasoning and then
examine congressional intent to arrive at the correct interpretation of
section 523(a)(19), namely that the section provides an automatic
exception from discharge to all settlements of securities laws
violations, even if the settlement does not resolve the question of
liability, such as no-fault settlements.
A. Refuting Mollasgo
The holding in Mollasgo is faulty because it roots itself in a
misapplication of precedent. Mollasgo relies on Archer v. Warner,
which held that settlement agreements do not create an absolute
novation (replacing the original debt with a new one, which in theory
would be unconnected to the fraud and thus not excepted from
discharge), but rather that bankruptcy courts should look to the
circumstances that gave rise to the settlement to determine if the
settlement arises from conduct that would render the debt non115
dischargeable.
In Archer, the plaintiff-creditor sued the defendant-debtor for
116
money allegedly obtained through fraud.
The parties settled the
112
113
114
115
116

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.
Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 323 (2003).
Id. at 316–17.
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suit, releasing all claims, but the settlement agreement did not
117
The defendant-debtor
resolve the question of liability.
subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and the plaintiff-creditor claimed
that the settlement debt was non-dischargeable since it was for money
118
obtained by fraud, which is a type of non-dischargeable debt
119
pursuant to section 523(a)(2). Defendant-debtor claimed that the
settlement agreement created a novation, that is the defendantdebtor claimed that the settlement debt was the result of the
bargaining between the two parties and not a debt for money
120
obtained through fraud. The Court held for the plaintiff-creditor,
121
reasoning that the settlement did not create a total novation, and if
the bankruptcy court determined that the defendant-debtor had
defrauded plaintiff-creditor, the settlement agreement would be non122
dischargeable.
Mollasgo applied this principle to hold that
settlements that fail to resolve liability are not automatically
dischargeable under section 523(a)(19), but rather the bankruptcy
123
court must make a liability determination.
Archer, however, is inapplicable to section 523(a)(19) cases. In
Archer, the settlement at issue resolved claims of fraud, the debt of
which is non-dischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(2), which does
124
not mention settlement agreements.
The Archer court recognized
that allowing fraudulent debtors to escape their burden through
bankruptcy is unsound, and thus charged bankruptcy courts to look
125
past the settlement agreement to determine dischargeability.
Subsequently, many courts have looked behind settlement
agreements when determining dischargeability for section 523(a)(2)
126
cases, and other similar claims.
Cases brought under section
117

Id.
Id.
119
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006).
120
Archer, 538 U.S. at 318.
121
Id. at 323.
122
Id.
123
Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 453 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).
124
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006).
125
Archer, 538 U.S. at 323 (“We conclude that the Archers’ settlement agreement
and releases may have worked a kind of novation, but that fact does not bar the
Archers from showing that the settlement debt arose out of ‘false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud,’ and consequently is nondischargeable.”) (quoting §
523(a)(2)(A)).
126
See, e.g., Giamo v. DeTrano (In re DeTrano), 326 F.3d 319, 322–23 (2d Cir.
2003) (stating that “a debt incurred pursuant to a settlement agreement is
nondischargeable in bankruptcy if the agreement settled claims that, if proven,
would have created a nondischargeable debt,” and further stating that, “[i]f the
118
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523(a)(19), however, should not be subject to the same analysis as
fraud cases that fall under section 523(a)(2). Congress intentionally
used the phrase “settlement agreements” in section 523(a)(19)(B),
thus granting them preclusive effect without being subject to Archer’s
127
judicially created doctrine.
Archer, therefore, is inapplicable to
section 523(a)(19) dischargeability claims, and it was improper for
the Mollasgo court to rely on it.
The Mollasgo court further misapplied relevant case law in its
128
reliance on Meyer v. Ridgon.
Unlike section 523(a)(2), section
523(a)(11) is helpful in determining the nature of the preclusive
effect granted to settlements under section 523(a)(19) since section
523(a)(11) excepts from discharge all debts arising from the
fraudulent actions committed by persons acting in a fiduciary
capacity to a bank, including such debts “contained in a settlement
129
agreement.” The Mollasgo court recognized this and properly
looked to a case discussing section 523(a)(11)’s application to
settlements, Meyer v. Ridgon, but the Mollasgo court attributed an
130
erroneous holding to Meyer.
In Meyer, the defendant was the president of a bank and was sued
131
for breaching his fiduciary duties.
The court entered a default
132
The
judgment against him for failing to answer the complaint.
defendant then filed for bankruptcy and the plaintiff-creditors
petitioned the court to determine that the debt was non133
dischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(11).
In its holding, the
Meyer court stated:
The plain language of section 523(a)(11) . . . alters the
common law collateral estoppel rules with respect to default
judgments,
settlement
agreements,
and
certain
administrative agency decisions. . . . [It] requires the
bankruptcy court to give preclusive effect to . . . non-court
approved settlement agreements, that would not be given
bankruptcy court determines that the debt DeTrano owes pursuant to the settlement
agreement ‘arises out of’ fraud, that debt must be excepted from discharge”).
127
It should be noted that Hodges v. Buzzeo (In re Buzzeo), 365 B.R. 578 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 2007), discussed infra text accompanying notes 155–159, applies Archer to a
case brought under § 523(a)(19), but presumably because the debtor raised the very
novation argument that Archer precludes.
128
See supra notes 93–102 and accompanying text.
129
§ 523(a)(11).
130
See Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).
131
Meyer v. Ridgon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1377 (7th Cir. 1994).
132
Id.
133
Id.
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preclusive effect under the common law. Therefore, we
must conclude that Congress intended to preempt the
134
common law by enacting section 523(a)(11).
The Meyer court further stated that a bankruptcy court is prohibited
from requiring further evidence to determine the dischargeability of
debts arising from the settlements or final orders specified in section
135
523(a)(11); bankruptcy courts must give such settlements and
136
orders an automatic preclusive effect.
Thus, the Mollasgo court interpreted Meyer incorrectly, and Meyer
actually supports the proposition that settlements that do not
establish liability are nevertheless excepted from discharge under
section 523(a)(19). Despite Meyer’s holding that section 523(a)(11)
grants all settlements and default judgments—which by definition do
not
determine
liability—preclusive
effect
in
subsequent
137
dischargeability proceedings, the Mollasgo court used Meyer as
138
support for holding that a liability determination is necessary.
Mollasgo pointed to the fact that the Meyer court looked behind the
default judgment to determine if the complaint alleged fraudulent
139
conduct that would render the debt non-dischargeable. The Meyer
court, however, looked behind the default judgment to the complaint
140
because the court was reviewing the case de novo, and the
defendant-debtor argued that the original suit was not for conduct
141
that would render the debt non-dischargeable.
The court did not
look behind the default judgment because it was required to in order
to determine dischargeability. Conversely, in Mollasgo both parties
agreed that the underlying claims, if true, would render the debt
142
non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(19).
Thus, Mollasgo
improperly relied on Meyer, which held that all settlements and
orders, regardless of the absence of a liability determination, are non143
dischargeable under section 523(a)(11).
Further, a proper reading of Meyer supports a conclusion that all
settlements for securities claims are automatically non-dischargeable,
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 1380 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1381.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 130–136.
Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).
Id.; see also Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1382–85.
Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1378.
Id. at 1382.
See generally Mollasgo, 419 B.R. 444.
Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1380.
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regardless of a definitive finding of liability. As Mollasgo notes, “cases
involving section 523(a)(11) and settlement agreements offer insight
144
Analysis of section
into the proper analysis of section 523(a)(19).”
523(a)(11) is relevant because “identical words used in different parts
145
of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”
Since
Congress gave preclusive effect to settlements under section
146
523(a)(11), it is apparent that Congress also intended to grant all
settlements preclusive effect under section 523(a)(19) so that
“regulators will now be able to prosecute these con artists with the
needed confidence that the victories won in enforcement
147
proceedings will not be nullified in bankruptcy proceedings.”
Accordingly, just as bankruptcy courts do not need to any additional
evidence to determine the non-dischargeability of settlements under
148
section 523(a)(11), settlements for securities laws violations are also
granted automatic preclusive effect by section 523(a)(19), regardless
of a definitive finding of liability.
The Mollasgo court also inappropriately distinguished Peterman v.
149
Whitcomb (In re Whitcomb) when reaching its holding, and Mollasgo’s
holding is therefore not in harmony with its sister jurisdiction’s
interpretation of section 523(a)(19). In Whitcomb, the plaintiffs sued
150
the defendant for fraud in connection with the sale of securities.
151
The parties settled the suit with the defendant admitting liability.
The plaintiff-creditors then sought a judicial determination that the
settlement was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to section

144

Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 455.
Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
146
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
147
Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1380 (quoting 136 CONG. REC. H13288, 13289 (daily ed. Oct.
27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Brooks)). Note that this statement is from the
legislative history of the enactment of § 523(a)(11) and supports the conclusion that
Congress used the same terms in sections 523(a)(11) and (a)(19) in order to give
preclusive effect to settlements under both sections. See infra Part III.B for a lengthy
discussion of similar Congressional statements in the history of § 523(a)(19).
Similarly, the court in Voss v. Pujdak (In re Pujdak), used this reasoning to hold that a
default judgment has preclusive effect, without looking behind the judgment, in
dischargeability determinations under § 523(a)(19). 462 B.R. 560, 576–79 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2011). But see Trimble v. Putman (In re Putman), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2117, at
*7 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. June 2, 2011) (refusing to apply collateral estoppel principles to
a default judgment in a dischargeability determination under § 523(a)(19)).
148
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
149
303 B.R. 806 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
150
Id. at 807.
151
Id. at 807–08.
145
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523(a)(19) and the court deemed the debt non-dischargeable. The
Mollasgo court distinguished Whitcomb on the basis that the defendant
153
The Whitcomb court,
admitted to harming the plaintiff-creditors.
however, noted while judging on the pleadings that the first element
of section 523(a)(19), a violation, was proven because the
154
“[c]omplaint alleged that the debt results from fraud . . . .”
Thus,
the Whitcomb court indicated that an allegation that a debt results from
securities fraud is sufficient to meet the first requirement of section
523(a)(19), a violation, and render a debt non-dischargeable, even
absent an admission to the allegations. Accordingly, Mollasgo’s
holding is not in accord with the Northern District of Illinois’s
apparent interpretation of section 523(a)(19).
The Mollasgo court also wrongly distinguished Hodges v. Buzzeo
155
(In re Buzzeo).
In Buzzeo the plaintiffs sued the defendant for the
156
fraudulent sale of securities in violation of state securities laws. The
parties entered into a settlement agreement that failed to resolve
157
liability, but the defendant waived his right to dischargeability.
Based on this waiver, the Mollasgo court distinguished Buzzeo’s
holding that the settlement was not dischargeable pursuant to section
158
523(a)(19).
The Buzzeo decision, however, could not have turned
on the dischargeability waiver since a waiver of dischargeability prior
to petitioning for bankruptcy is unenforceable as against public
159
policy.
Accordingly, Buzzeo must have granted summary judgment
to the creditor because the settlement agreement is simply not

152

Id. at 807.
Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).
154
Whitcomb, 303 B.R. at 810 (emphasis added).
155
365 B.R. 578 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007); see also Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 456.
156
Buzzeo, 365 B.R. at 580.
157
Id.
158
Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 456–57 (citing Buzzeo, 365 B.R. at 580–81). In re Schwartz
erroneously made the same distinction when denying summary judgment in similar
circumstances to those of Mollasgo. Star High Yield Inv. Mgmt. Corp. v. Schwartz (In
re Schwartz), No. 07-30508, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3594 at *12 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct.
17, 2007). In Schwartz, the court was concerned with the debtor’s summary judgment
motion, in which defendant-debtor argued a novation theory that Archer precluded.
Id. Nevertheless, Schwartz, in passing, distinguished Buzzeo because of the waiver
when denying creditor’s cross motion for summary judgment. Id.
159
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2006) (“A discharge in a case under this title . . .
operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an
action . . . whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.”); Cheripka v. Republic
Ins. Co (In re Cheripka), No. 91-3249, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30343 (3d Cir. Dec. 31,
1991), aff’d en banc by an equally divided court, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38449 (3d Cir.
Feb. 24, 1992).
153
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dischargeable since section 523(a)(19) renders all settlements of
securities violations non-dischargeable, regardless of whether or not
liability is established. Thus, Mollasgo’s holding is also not aligned
with the Western District of Pennsylvania’s evident interpretation of
section 523(a)(19).
In addition to misinterpreting the above cases, the Mollasgo
court is apparently not in accord with other jurisdictions, as well. In
Faris v. Bahram Amir Jafari (In re Beharm Amir Jafari) the defendant
allegedly defrauded the plaintiff-investors in connection with the sale
160
of securities, in violation of securities laws.
The plaintiffs took no
other action besides seeking a judicial determination of non161
dischargeability for a debt that the defendant had yet to incur. The
court therefore denied the plaintiff-creditors’ summary judgment
motion to determine the debt non-dischargeable under section
523(a)(19) because at the time of the hearing “[p]laintiffs had not
yet filed an action in another forum to obtain an order, judgment or
decree, holding the Debtor liable for securities violations or securities
fraud. Nor [had] they entered into a settlement agreement with the Debtor
162
resolving a claim for securities violations or securities fraud.”
Thus, the
Faris court seemingly held that a settlement agreement could satisfy
the requirements of section 523(a)(19) without any further
163
determination of liability.
Additionally, Frost v. Civiello (In re Civiello) supports a conclusion
164
inapposite of Mollasgo’s.
In Civiello, the defendant sold non165
The Ohio
registered securities in violation of state securities laws.
Division of Securities, the institution responsible for enforcing Ohio
166
167
Securities Laws, issued defendant a Cease and Desist Order. The
Cease and Desist Order did not determine liability, nor was there any

160

401 B.R. 494, 495 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009).
Id.
162
Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
163
An ambiguous statement appears later in the opinion that could be read to
contradict the court’s earlier reasoning. See 401 B.R. at 499 (“Thus, the Court
concludes that, absent a settlement agreement or other consensual determination of
liability, Subsection B evidences a conscious choice to have the liability determination
occur outside the bankruptcy forum . . . .”). This statement can be explained,
however, since the plaintiff-creditor was asking the court to determine liability and
render a debt non-dischargeable.
164
348 B.R. 459 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006).
165
Id. at 461.
166
Id. at 464.
167
Id.
161
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168

adjudicatory hearing.
The court held that the Cease and Desist
Order, which did not determine liability, was sufficient to satisfy the
169
violation of section 523(a)(19).
Nace v. Quibell (In re Quibell) also supports the argument that a
Cease and Desist letter is sufficient to establish the “violation”
170
requirement of section 523(a)(19).
In Quibell, the Pennsylvania
Securities Commission issued a Cease and Desist letter to a company,
which the defendant-debtor promoted as an investment to the
171
plaintiff, for violations of state securities laws.
The defendantdebtor owed the plaintiff money on a note that the defendant-debtor
gave the plaintiff “for reasons that [were] unclear on the record,” but
apparently related to the company that received a Cease and Desist
172
Order.
The court denied summary judgment for the plaintiff on
the issue of dischargeability of the note under section 523(a)(19),
because the plaintiff “failed to establish a nexus between the Cease
173
and Desist Order and the judgment note,” and thus could not
174
This
establish that the debt was for a violation of securities laws.
reasoning suggests that had the plaintiff established the nexus, the
Cease and Desist Order would have been sufficient to establish a
violation of securities laws for purposes of dischargeability under
175
section 523(a)(19),
and thus Mollasgo’s requirement of an
affirmative establishment of liability is not in accord. The above cases
suggest that other jurisdictions do not interpret section 523(a)(19) as
Mollasgo does, but rather they hold that settlements that do not
resolve liability are nevertheless non-dischargeable under section
523(a)(19).

168

Id. at 462.
Id. at 465–66.
170
See 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1423 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2012).
171
Id. at *6.
172
Id. at *19.
173
Id. at *19–20.
174
Id. at *20.
175
Other language in the opinion may suggest that a Cease and Desist order is
not sufficient to establish the requisite violation of securities laws for the purposes of
section 523(a)(19). Id. at *18 (“But even if the issuance of a Cease and Desist Order
establishes that a violation of Pennsylvania Securities Laws occurred,” the debt would
still be dischargeable since the plaintiff could not establish a connection between the
defendant and the Cease and Desist order (emphasis added)). But see Nace v.
Quibell (In re Quibell), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1423, at * 19–21 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Apr. 4,
2012) (stating, when dismissing the complaint, that had the plaintiff established a
nexus between the defendant-debtor and the Cease and Desist Order, a violation of
securities laws would have been established for the purposes of section 523(a)(19)).
169
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B. Mollasgo is Contrary to Congress’s Intent that All Settlements for
Securities Violations be Non-Dischargeable
The legislative history indicates that the Mollasgo holding is
contrary to the true intent of the statute. As one commentator noted,
“[t]he legislative intent behind § 523(a)(19) is quite clear; it was
176
added to protect investors.”
In adding the securities-claims
exception to discharge, Congress sought to close a loophole that
allowed fraudsters to use the bankruptcy code to avoid debts for their
177
wrongdoing. As the section-by-section analysis states:
Under current laws, state regulators are often forced to
“reprove” their fraud cases in bankruptcy court to prevent
discharge because remedial statutes often have different
technical elements than the analogous common law causes
of action. Moreover, settlements may not have the same collateral
estoppel effect as judgments obtained through fully litigated legal
proceedings. In short, with their resources already stretched
to the breaking point, state regulators must plow the same
ground twice in securities fraud cases.
By ensuring
securities law judgments and settlements in state cases are
non-dischargeable, precious state enforcement resources
will be preserved and directed at preventing fraud in the
178
first place.
The record further states that the section
make[s] judgments and settlements arising from state and
federal law violations brought by state and federal
regulators and private individuals non-dischargeable.
Current bankruptcy law may permit wrongdoers to
discharge their obligations under court judgments or
settlements based on securities fraud and securities law
179
violations. This loophole in the law should be closed . . . .
Thus the section-by-section analysis makes clear that the statute is
intended to give all settlements relating to securities laws violations a
180
collateral estoppel effect that they would normally not receive.
The section-by-section analysis is authoritative because courts
frequently rely on section-by-section analyses when discerning the
181
legislature’s intent.
Additionally, the section-by-section analysis
176
177
178
179
180
181

Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 329–30 (internal quotations omitted).
S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002); see also supra text accompanying notes 22–24.
S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002) (emphasis added).
Id.
See id.
See, e.g., Smith v. Gibbons (In re Gibbons), 289 B.R. 588, 594 (2003) (giving
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explicitly states that the analysis is intended “to provide guidance in
182
Further, Congress
the legal interpretation of these provisions.”
previously granted settlements preclusive effect in section
183
523(a)(11). Congress is aware of the terms it uses in other sections
184
Accordingly,
and their effect on new sections if used again.
Congress intended to give settlements under section 523(a)(19) the
same preclusive effect they are afforded under section 523(a)(11).
Mollasgo, therefore, was in error by stating that Congress “focuse[d]
on resolved securities violations, rather than on settled claims of
185
securities violations.”
Interpreting the statute to require
settlements to be accompanied by litigated findings of liability is
illogical since parties enter into settlement agreements as a way to
avoid litigation, and thus settlement agreements will rarely present
186
actual findings. Such an interpretation would render the statutory
187
phrase “any settlement agreement” meaningless.
Canons of statutory construction also support the conclusion
that all securities claims settlements, regardless of liability
determinations, are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. Mollasgo based
its theory on the vague statutory language and the statute’s use of the
word “and,” which seemingly requires the presence of all enumerated
188
elements for the dischargability exception to apply. But “and” does
189
not always mean “and”; it can sometimes mean “or.” When “a strict
grammatical construction will frustrate evident legislative intent, a
190
court may read ‘and’ as ‘or’ . . . .”
This is especially true when
191
Congress rushes complex legislation through both houses, as was
“substantial weight” to the section-by-section analysis behind section 523(a)(19)).
182
148 CONG. REC. S7418 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
183
See supra text accompanying notes 129–147.
184
Sambur, supra note 63, at 571; see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581
(1978) (“Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the
interpretation” of prior terms “at least insofar as it affects the new statute.”); United
States v. Palozie, 166 F.3d 502, 504–05 (2d. Cir. 1999) (stating that when Congress
enacts a new law using identical language that has already been interpreted by the
courts, it is presumed that Congress intended the interpreted meaning).
185
Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 452 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).
186
See Halpern v. First Ga. Bank (In re Halpern), 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.
1987); Hutchens v. Temples (In re Temples), No. 05-9134, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3174
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2006).
187
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2006).
188
See supra text accompanying notes 77–80 and 30–37.
189
KIM, supra note 30, at 8.
190
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
191
See id.; DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 573 (1956) (“[T]he word ‘or’ is
often used as a careless substitute for the word ‘and.’”).
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192

the case with SOX. Further, statutes should always be construed in
193
But if Mollasgo’s
a way that does not render any part superfluous.
holding is correct, then the statute is superfluous. Simply put, if a
definitive violation of securities laws was always required then there
would never be a chance for settlements, which do not determine
194
liability, to be deemed non-dischargeable.
Lastly, Mollasgo’s holding is detrimental to public policy goals, at
least when it is applied to government agencies. The Mollasgo court
reasoned that rendering all securities litigation settlements nondischargeable would discourage debtors from entering into
settlement agreements and thereby open the floodgates to
195
litigation.
Although this argument has some merit, it ignores the
fact that subjecting settlements to litigation in bankruptcy court will
discourage plaintiffs from settling claims. Since the purpose of the
statute was to preserve “precious state enforcement resources” and
save regulators from having to “plow the same ground twice,” it seems
that Congress intended to encourage governmental plaintiffs to
196
settle.
Thus, making settlements unattractive to governmentplaintiffs appears irrational. Indeed, the government’s need to save
its resources is at the crux of a current debate over a federal judge’s
rejection of an SEC settlement with a defendant-bank that neither
197
admitted nor denied liability.
It is undeniable that automatically
rendering securities settlements non-dischargeable is unfair to some
factually innocent but prosecuted debtors, but that result is the
192

See supra text accompanying notes 60–70.
KIM, supra note 30, at 12; see also Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino,
501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991).
194
See Reply Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment/Summary Adjudication, supra note 33, at *7.
195
Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 454 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).
196
S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002).
197
See Eaglesham & Bray, supra note 33; Edward Wyatt, Judge Blocks Citigroup
TIMES
(Nov.
28,
2011),
Settlement
With
SEC,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/business/judge-rejects-sec-accord-withciti.html?pagewanted=all (“The [SEC] . . . must settle most of the cases it brings
because it does not have the money or the staff to battle deep-pocketed Wall Street
firms in court. Wall Street firms will rarely admit wrongdoing, the agency says,
because that can be used against them in investor lawsuits.”); Jake Zamansky, Rakoff
Rejection of Citi / SEC Settlement Pierces Wall Street’s Alice-in-Wonderland Thinking, FORBES
(Nov.
29,
2011,
2:44
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jakezamansky/2011/11/29/rakoff-rejection-of-citi-secsettlement-pierces-wall-streets-alice-in-wonderland-thinking/ (arguing that rejection
of no-fault settlements is proper because it disallows companies to write off fraud as a
cost of business and prevents the SEC from obtaining “wrist-slap” settlements for
conduct that is not actually a violation of the law).
193
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conscious decision of the legislature. Innocent debtors can avoid
non-dischargeability by refusing to settle and pursuing litigation.
After examining the legislative record, it is apparent that
Congress intended to grant preclusive effect to securities-claims
settlements that do not establish liability. Further, principles of
statutory construction validate this interpretation.
Mollasgo’s
argument to the contrary is ill founded, as it is based on misapplied
precedent and is inconsistent with other jurisdictions’
interpretations.
Rather, the correct interpretation of section
523(a)(19) renders all securities claims settlements nondischargeable in bankruptcy; even those that fail to establish liability
for securities violations. We are thus faced with the policy dilemma
posited in the beginning of this Comment.
IV. POLICY CONCERNS DICTATE A NECESSARY AMENDMENT TO
SECTION 523(A)(19)
Congress may have intended that section 523(a)(19) except
from discharge all settlements related to securities violations, but the
question remains if that action serves public policy. As Mollasgo
noted, section 523(a)(19) seriously hampers the longstanding,
198
fundamental “fresh start” goal of bankruptcy. The ramifications are
highlighted by Art Vandelay’s story, presented in this Comment’s
199
introduction.
The scope of section 523(a)(19) reaches beyond what Congress
200
sought to address.
For example, while the enactment was in
response to corporate scandals, the section’s applicability is not so
limited and applies even to small privately held securities of
201
companies that are not publicly traded.
Further, there are
numerous technical violations of securities laws that a debtor could
202
inadvertently violate without any fraudulent intent.
Given
Congress’s intent to curb corporate fraud, it seems wrong to punish
securities violators that acted without any scienter or fraudulent
203
intent.
Additionally, section 523(a)(19) only applies to individual
204
debtors, and not corporations.
Thus, individuals will feel the full
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 454–55.
See supra text accompanying note 4.
See supra Part III.B.
Warner, supra note 29, at 44.
Id.; Pearson, supra note 4.
See supra Part III.B.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006) (“A discharge under [the various bankruptcy
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force of Congress’s reactionary regulatory force aimed at fraudulent
corporations like Enron, which are outside the scope of the discharge
205
exception.
The securities-claim exception also gives a windfall to private
litigants. Most securities fraud cases are brought by private litigants
206
and resemble ordinary tort claims.
Additionally, most securities
claims settle for amounts dramatically smaller than the plaintiffs’
207
original demands. The reason such cases settle is because securities
defendants are risk-averse, pessimistic, and unwilling to expose
208
themselves to further liability. Therefore, the fact that a case settles
does not reflect that the underlying claims were meritorious. Section
523(a)(19) gives these private plaintiffs a windfall by exempting their
settlements from discharge in bankruptcy even though it is possible,
if not probable, that liability would never have been established if the
claims were actually litigated. This exemption thus gives plaintiffs
209
tremendous bargaining power at the settlement table by allowing
them to extract settlements of dubious claims from risk-averse
defendants and have the settlement obligation survive the debtor’s
subsequent bankruptcy.
chapters] does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt” that is listed in this
section.) (emphasis added); § 1141 (indicating that in a bankruptcy filed under
Chapter 11 there is no securities laws violations exception to discharge); In re
WorldCom, Inc., 329 B.R. 10, 13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“The simple answer to this
contention is that Section 523(a)(19) is applicable only to individual debtors. It has
no application to corporate debtors such as WorldCom . . . . If the drafters [of SOX]
were indeed . . . confused . . . it will be for Congress to change the statute, not this
Court.”); Ebaugh, supra note 54.
205
Individuals may have some protection, however, since debts arising from
securities claims are subordinated to other debts. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2006). But
subordination offers little peace of mind since it will only result in the debtor
avoiding such obligations if the debtor runs out of money to pay other debts.
Furthermore, an individual who files for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 will be able to
discharge debts for securities law violations that section 523(a)(19) would otherwise
except from an individual’s discharge. § 1328. A “hardship discharge” under
Chapter 13, however, would not discharge the debt that is excepted by section
523(a)(19). § 1328(c). Accordingly, only individuals who file for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 7, or receive a hardship discharge under Chapter 13, will
have debt arising from securities law violations excepted from discharge. For a
comprehensive yet comprehensible explanation of the various chapters of
bankruptcy and their respective nuances, see BANKR. JUDGES DIV., supra note 5.
206
Yablon, supra note 37, at 571–72.
207
See id. at 586.
208
Id. at 588.
209
See generally Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of
Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006) (explaining the
economics of negotiating and settlements).
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This result is contrary to the general federal policy of
discouraging private securities claims. Congress passed the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) because of abusive tactics
210
by private securities plaintiffs. Since then, case law developed in a
way that reduces the likelihood that plaintiffs will bring and win civil
211
securities suits. Private plaintiffs now face procedural barriers and
are effectively discouraged from using courts to resolve their private
212
securities claims.
It seems odd, therefore, that section 523(a)(19)
would grant such bargaining power to plaintiffs in private securities
suits.
An amendment to the code would alleviate these public policy
concerns. First, the windfall to private plaintiffs can easily be avoided.
Additionally, congressional intent, public policy, and section
523(a)(19) can all be aligned if an amendment to section 523(a)(19)
excepts only debt that arises out of fraudulent securities laws
violations and does not allow an automatic exception for settlements
entered into with private litigants, unless liability for the fraudulent
violations is established.
Such an amendment will avoid section 523(a)(19)’s harsh
treatment of non-fraudulent, technical violations of securities laws.
An amendment can stipulate that only debts arising out of violations
committed with fraudulent intent are non-dischargeable, whether
213
they are owed to the government or private plaintiffs. By allowing
private plaintiffs to benefit from this provision, innocent investors
who obtain judgments or settlements that admit liability against those
214
who defrauded them will not be able to be duped again.
It is
acceptable to allow private plaintiffs to obtain automatically nondischargeable judgments for their securities claims because the facts
were actually adjudicated after plaintiffs met the heightened
215
Moreover, judgments that private
standards of the PSLRA.
plaintiffs obtain do not pose the risk that automatically nondischargeable settlements do in regards to strong-arming risk-averse
216
defendants at the settlement table.
Likewise, there is no public
210

PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4 (2006); see also Yablon, supra note 37, at 569.
Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance Among Corporate Criminal Liability, Private
Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1459, 1474 (2009).
212
Id.
213
See generally Sambur, supra note 63 (arguing that the current version of §
523(a)(19) only applies to fraudulent violations prosecuted by the government).
214
See supra text accompanying notes 21–24.
215
See supra text, accompanying notes 220–22.
216
See supra text accompanying notes 205–11.
211
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policy concern when settlements that admit liability are automatically
non-dischargeable. Additionally, limiting section 523(a)(19) to
fraudulent violations will remove concerns about punishing innocent
217
debtors in technical violation of laws,. Such an amendment would
also align the effects of section 523(a)(19) with congressional intent
218
to curb fraud.
An amendment could also stipulate that only no-fault
settlements entered into with government regulators are
automatically non-dischargeable, and thus private litigants cannot use
section 523(a)(19) to strong-arm defendants into settling non219
meritorious claims for larger amounts.
This would resolve the
inherent tension between the policy goals of the PSLRA—to curb
frivolous private securities claims—and the current effects of section
523(a)(19). Rendering the government the only creditor that can
obtain automatically non-dischargeable no-fault settlements will also
prevent some unjust results, like those presented in Art Vandelay’s
story.
Limiting section 523(a)(19)’s applicability to no-fault
settlements with government creditors also aligns the section with
congressional intent. Congress passed the section in order to save
government resources and prevent regulators from having to re220
litigate securities claims against fraudulent debtors.
Allowing
private litigants to use section 523(a)(19) to automatically except
from discharge settlements that do not establish liability does not
further this purported goal. While one can argue that by facilitating
private securities claims through section 523(a)(19) the government
will be relieved from having to prosecute as many claims and thereby
save resources, Congress expressly rejected this option when passing
221
the PSLRA.
Accordingly, limiting section 523(a)(19)’s automatic
exception for no-fault settlements to government-debtors is the only
way to reconcile congressional intent behind both section
523(a)(19)’s and PSLRA’s enactments. Private plaintiffs’ settlements
may still be found non-dischargeable if the fraudulent violations of
securities laws are actually proven or admitted to, thus preventing
fraudsters from utilizing legal loopholes and granting protection to
217

See Pearson, supra note 4.
S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002); see also supra Part III.B.
219
See generally Yablon, supra note 37, and Grundfest & Huang, supra note 209
(describing how non-meritorious securities claims force risk-averse defendants to
settle cases for more than the actual settlement is worth).
220
S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002); see also supra Part III.B.
221
See supra text accompanying notes 206–09.
218
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innocent creditors without running afoul of the policy behind the
222
PSLRA. Lastly, singling out the government as a preferred creditor
is not a novel idea, as the bankruptcy code distinguishes between
223
government and non-government creditors in other sections. Thus,
proposing an amendment to do so with section 523(a)(19) is not a
radical suggestion, and any argument that the bankruptcy code
should treat all creditors equally is a position that Congress has
already rejected.
In sum, an amendment that limits non-dischargeability to
fraudulent securities violations and distinguishes between
governmental and private creditors with regards to no-fault
settlements—but still automatically excepts from discharge private
plaintiffs’ judgments and settlements where liability is otherwise
established—will remedy the unintended consequences of section
523(a)(19) and reshape the section to reflect Congress’s original
intent.
V. CONCLUSION
In enacting section 523(a)(19), Congress sought to remedy one
problem but created another. In its attempt to remedy corporate
fraud in the wake of Enron and other shocking scandals, it usurped
important policy considerations—the fresh start, for example—that
the bankruptcy code is intended to further. The current securitiesclaims exception to discharge, as written in section 523(a)(19) of the
bankruptcy code, is vague and overbroad. The plain language seems
to except from discharge all settlements of securities laws violations
while simultaneously requiring a definitive finding of liability, which
settlements often do not provide.
The vagueness that the poorly crafted language creates is eroded
upon examination of the legislative intent. Congress’s intent plainly
was to except all settlements of securities laws violations from
discharge in bankruptcy. This results, however, in a statute that
harms the innocent and unfortunate debtor while letting some
culprits run free. A settlement of a weak case based on alleged
technical violations will survive a bankruptcy petition and the
exception is inapplicable to the fraudulent corporations that inspired
Congress to act. While Congress’s intentions are laudable, the
language of the statute does not accurately reflect them. This stark
222

See supra notes 210–11 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2006) (excepting certain fines owed to the
government from discharge); see also Sambur, supra note 63.
223
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contrast manifested itself recently in Mollasgo. Mollasgo, driven by
policy concerns, misinterpreted the true meaning of the securitiesclaims exception from discharge. Its reasoning was based on
misapplied precedent and faulty distinctions. Thus, while the
Mollasgo court’s holding that settlements are excepted from discharge
only when liability for securities laws violations is established softens
the inappropriate bite of section 523(a)(19), it does so wrongly
because it is up to Congress to correct its own mistakes.
Rather, the legislature must heed the lesson of Mollasgo and
amend the section to reflect public policy. The government has a
legitimate interest in saving resources, but the current statute is
overbroad and infringes upon the fresh start policy of bankruptcy.
Policy favors holding Pennypacker to his settlement but not
Vandelay. An amendment that distinguishes between no-fault
settlements with the government and private creditors, as well as
renders the section inapplicable to non-fraudulent, technical
violations of the law will strike the proper balance between saving
government resources while protecting against securities fraud and
preserving the fresh start for those who deserve it. Until Congress
passes an amendment, section 523(a)(19) of the bankruptcy code will
continue to punish the innocent and allow fraudsters to navigate
through loopholes.

